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Panel I: Administrative Agencies,
Private Parties, and the Courts
PROFESSOR KOH: Our first speaker on the panel on Administrative
Agencies, Private Parties, and the Courts is Mr. Peter D. Ehrenhaft. Mr.
Ehrenhaft was a senior law clerk to ChiefJustice Warren of the Supreme Court,
has been a partner at a number offirms, was the Deputy Secretary and Special
Counsel for Tariff Affairs at the Treasury Department-a job which several
other panelists have held in various forms-and is currently a partner at the
Washington firm of Bryan, Cave, McPheeters & McRoberts. He has taught
trade policy at George Washington University Law School and the University
of Pennsylvania Law School, and he is the author of numerous articles in this
area.
MR. PETER D. EHRENHAF1: Let me begin by suggesting that
the main problem in considering what trade law is and ought to be,
is that we lack a consensus within our society as to what the real
issues are that ought to be addressed. We have been focusing on
peripheral issues that are more easily understandable and more sus-
ceptible to fixes (or perceived fixes) by our agencies and by our
Congress, perhaps because we are not fully able to come to grips
with what needs to be done to address the real issues.
I find essentially three of these "real issues": The first is: How
does an economy in a democratic society adjust to change? The fact
of change is overwhelming and inexorable. At the same time,
change is a very uncomfortable phenomenon; many people don't
like it. And yet those same people are voters-particularly in our
society, where we vote pretty often-and adjustment to change takes
longer than the periods between elections. This phenomenon puts
terrible pressures on elected officials. It is one of the very serious
problems in addressing the two other "real problems" of trade law.
The second real problem is: What do we do with overproduc-
tion? It is a surprise, I suppose, at a time when one sees daily pic-
tures of people starving in Ethiopia, of barrios in South America,
and of homeless people even in the United States, to suggest that we
are awash in overproduction. But, despite pictures from around the
world, the problems most in need of solution by our trade policy
boil down to: What we should do with too many cars and semicon-
ductors, too much steel and wheat? Overproduction is everywhere.
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It is a natural outgrowth of the need and desire for jobs, which in
the modern world is a key commitment of governments.
The third, and last, real problem of trade law is: How can we be
responsive to our citizens, fair to our friends, faithful to our interna-
tional commitments, and at the same time dedicated to the rule of
law? These four requirements are mutually exclusive in many situa-
tions which the trade law addresses. They can't very well be simul-
taneously accommodated, and yet some kind of accommodation is
required.
I am convinced that most of the decisions taken under our
existing trade law do not completely respond to any of those four
criteria. They pretend to meet them but in fact do not. Instead, our
trade law devotes too many of our resources and diverts our atten-
tions to what I have described elsewhere as "pimples on the land-
scape of our trade picture." Most of the countervailing' and
antidumping 2 duty cases over which oceans of ink are spilled in the
periodicals affect a very small amount of trade.
Another favorite theme of mine is that we really don't know what
the effect of our trade laws is, and we have been afraid to find out.
No systematic effort is made to analyze the after-effects of antidump-
ing, countervailing or Section 301 cases. One small beginning was
made by the General Accounting Office (GAO) in a study of five
cases brought under the then Section 201 "escape clause" 4 in which
it attempted to analyze what happened after the ITC acted. Did the
industries that obtained relief actually secure their market positions
and the restoration to economic health that they hoped to achieve
when they invoked these trade laws? The results were very incon-
clusive. The main reason relates to the very first point that I made:
There is very little in the world that is static. Factors such as prod-
uct changes, different producers, and different demands by consum-
ers all have significant effects, probably far in excess of any quota
that was or can be imposed with regard to most commodities that
are internationally traded.
With regard to the internationally traded commodities that make
up our enormous trade deficit, as distinguished from the small
noisemakers that occupy the time of trade law administrators, the
trade laws seem to be particularly ineffective, almost irrelevant.
1. See Glossary at 129.
2. See Glossary at 129.
3. See Glossary at 130.
4. See Glossary at 130.
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Why is that so? Let me briefly go back to the three issues that I
outlined at the beginning and comment a bit about them.
First: adjustment to change. As I think you will agree, change is a
fundamental fact of life. Therefore, as a priority of all policy, it
seems to me that we must act on our belief that change is inevitable,
and that we must devise ways to respond to change. That response
should not depend on whether the change comes from within our
country or from abroad. Is there a rational, principled way to distin-
guish between domestically caused change and foreign-caused
change? I think not. A wonderfully illustrative incident occurred to
me while I was still in the government, which brought this truism
home to me. It concerned a gentleman who made slide rules. He
claimed that the production of slide rules was a wonderful business,
particularly as he made very expensive, hand-crafted models. But
his entire business was wiped out within 18 months by the introduc-
tion of the hand-held calculator. The hand-held calculator was
faster, cheaper, more widely available; everything that the slide rule
could do, other than serve as an object d'art for display as an antique,
could be done better by the hand-held calculator. That technologi-
cal change compelled the gentleman to give up his family's century-
old plant and fire his 250 employees. There was nothing that he
could do to preserve the slide rule business. There was nothing the
government would do to maintain their production. But think of
what would have happened if slide rules had been dumped by the
Koreans. The whole panoply of our government trade apparatus
would have become available to charge onto the scene asking,
"What can we do to save the slide rule makers?" But because the
slide rule was rendered obsolete by the hand-held calculator, there
was nothing in our volumes of economic laws to deal with the
"problem," if, in fact, it was a societal "problem."
It seems to me that if we have a sensible outlook toward change,
we must ask ourselves, if there is a material difference between
change induced by the "external" forces of foreign production and
change required by "internal" forces, such as new technology, new
fads, the weather, the elections, or whatever. I suggest that we
ought not to have in our law a presumption that because a force for
change comes from the outside, we should have to have a wholly
different series of responses, a different legal mechanism, a wholly
different administration, and a wholly different way of assessing the
costs of adjustment than when we face a domestically caused
change.
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It is for this reason that I have been one of the few people practic-
ing trade law who have suggested that we abandon our administra-
tive method of assessing antidumping duties and substitute for it a
private damage action. Antidumping cases are really disputes be-
tween private parties about access to the market. That's all that they
are. There is no reason for the government to confront foreign gov-
ernments about dumping; there is no reason to send our govern-
ment investigators scurrying around foreign plants to investigate
foreign businesses' costs of production. If participants in the mar-
ket are "wronged" by competitors, private litigation remedies be-
tween the parties concerning their rights of access to the market
should be available. This litigation should be subject to a rule of law
that is identical to the one that we would apply domestically if a
party were engaged in price behavior that we thought was anticom-
petitive. If in New York we can't find a business tort reason for re-
sisting cheap goods made in New Jersey, then it seems to me it
should make no difference that those goods were made in Taiwan. I
think that a private remedy action would address that anomaly. I
would abolish the whole bunch of silly rules that undoubtedly dedi-
cated, but I suggest, misguided, bureaucrats have to administer. I
was one of them; I know.
My second point concerns responding to overproduction. This is
a very serious problem, whether it involves agricultural commodities
or industrial goods. Throughout the western world and even in less
developed countries, we are all making more steel, more plastics,
more textiles, and even more food than we can consume. (Perhaps
we could consume more; we just can't pay for the production of the
excess.) What is the world to do with these vast quantities of goods
that are not being and probably cannot be bought? Can we improve
their distribution? Can we provide money or other resources with
which those lacking could buy goods from those who turn them out?
We did that for a while-creating a debt crisis we also can't handle.
I was just in Japan yesterday. One of the ideas now floating
around in Tokyo was the proposal that Japan increase its demand
for our goods by stopping its people from working so hard! They
are too industrious. They still go to work on Saturdays. They still
work more than 40 hours each week. The idea was very seriously
proposed that they cut down their work week to accomplish two
goals: first, to reduce output, and, more importantly, to increase
nonwork time, creating a demand for leisure-time products that the
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Japanese don't have the time to enjoy now because they are working
so hard. Maybe that is something that we should think about.
There are probably other ways of stimulating demand and facili-
tating the distribution of supply. These measures are really what we
need, much more than 3.283% ad valorem dumping duties. But
even by suggesting such a change in priorities, I am tremendously
oversimplifying the underlying challenge of modifying a society's
values, which is what this Japanese proposal really contemplates.
Let me cite, for example, one very short story from my experience
in the government that illustrates the enormous complexity and in-
terrelation between the problem of overproduction and the core
values of a society.
The U.S. was going to impose a countervailing duty on Swiss
cheese made from milk obtained from cows grazing in the Swiss
Alps. Nasty of us to do that, because it was darn good cheese! But it
happened that the cheese was being produced from milk provided
by cows grazing at the 2,000- to 3,000-meter level in the Alps. It
cost so much to keep those cows housed and healthy up there in the
Alps that each liter of milk really cost as much to produce as a liter
of cognac. Yet the Swiss cheese that was being sold at the Safeway
in Washington was, of course, offered at about the same price as
cheese made by our good dairymen up in Wisconsin. The cut rate
for the real Swiss cheese was regarded as "unfair" by our folks.
Rightly so! We went to the Swiss and said, "You know, you just
can't export that cheese at that low price, because it is unfair to our
dairy farmers." And they said, "Well, yes, but we have to keep those
cows up there." We replied, "It costs so much, why do you keep
them up there?" They said, "Your tourists come over here and they
like to see those cows up in the Alps. The cows also cut the grass,
without which the Alps would be impassable for tourists." And we
said, "Then you have to put your cows into your tourist budget, not
your agriculture budget. Maybe they are really only expensive
lawnmowers."
The real point, of course, was that the Swiss wanted those cows up
in the Alps because they wanted the people who cared for them to
stay in the Alps. They don't want those farmers to come down and
live in the cities. That would create further problems. Thus, it is the
social reason, the political reason that impels governments to subsi-
dize people to live in the Alps, or to make steel in Youngstown. It is
a phenomenon as true here as in Switzerland. We can't simply say
every job is fungible, because it is not. People cannot easily move
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from here to there. So the overproduction problem must be ad-
dressed with more fundamental solutions than tacking duties or
quotas on imports. We must recognize it as a social problem, that
can only be solved by social means like cutting the Japanese work
week and not by trade law nit-picking.
The third problem I wanted to discuss is the difficulty of devising
and applying a body of law that is fair to all and to the ideals of our
international understandings. What trade law should we have? I
have already suggested my view that trade law, as such, is probably
an oxymoron. The "trade law" is not a principled body of ideals
and mechanisms for accomplishing these goals. Even though we
have fashioned a trade law on a "judicial model," we should regret
that fact. It is too expensive. There is little evidence that it works.
It involves governments in confrontations that they don't need.
And despite all of the "due process," the judicial review, the enrich-
ment of the lawyers, and the good feeling it gives to us lawyers that
we are doing something constructive and rational and in accordance
with our traditions, the end result is as phony as a three-dollar bill.
The dumping margins that are exquisitely calculated to three deci-
mal places are built on a castle of sand. Those numbers are rarely
based on hard facts and they fail to address completely the problems
of change or overproduction that really are meaningful in our inter-
national trade. To suggest that further elaborations of those laws
would do something constructive about easing our trade deficit or
overcoming our real economic problems is just wishful thinking.
At the same time, I, too, am a victim of wishful thinking. Here, on
campus, we can indulge ourselves. But what do we do when we re-
turn to Washington? I have a few suggestions. First, we need, I
think, something like the Robinson-Patman Act 5 to deal with dump-
ing, or something perhaps more traditional from our antitrust law.
We don't need a longer, more detailed antidumping law.
Second, I think that we do need a flexible, enforceable law like
Section 301 given more public attention and resources. No doubt
we need to expand the market abroad for our goods. Section 301
seems to be a plausible and effective way of doing so. Having just
come from Korea, I can assure you that they have heard that
message.
And, finally, if all that I have said is pie-in-the-sky, let me just
make a couple of more minor short-term recommendations for im-
5. Robinson-Patman Anti-Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 74-692, 49 Star. 1526
(1936) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 13 et seq. (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
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proving the law we have which could be accomplished without the
radical overhaul that I am anxious to see adopted.
First, I think we need sunset provisions in our law in dumping and
countervailing duty cases. It is absurd that they remain on the
books potentially forever. The European Community (EC) has
adopted sunsets. I think that there ought to be an end to these cases
after, let us say, two or three years. If the affected domestic industry
is still being hurt by imports at "unfair" prices, it should make a new
showing in a new investigation.
Second, I think we ought to adopt the EC's approach to calculat-
ing the duty to be assessed. They set the duty at the level needed to
overcome the injury, and not based on very elaborate case-by-case,
import-by-import, down-to-the-penny calculations we love to com-
pute. If we find dumping with regard to a particular product, and
we find that during the historic period the average margin was 14%,
let us apply a 14% "fine" for the next two years on those imports or,
better, a 10% duty to eliminate underselling or overcome "injury"
to the domestic industry. Let us then be done with the matter and
go on to something else more productive rather than involving
scores of people in determinations whether the 14% should be
13.67% with regard to this import and 14.67% for the next. The
allocation of our scarce resources to this exercise is just ridiculous.
Third, I would suggest that an expanded ITC would be the appro-
priate agency to handle all of our trade matters. I also suggest that,
as in the EC and Canada, the Commission devote as many resources
and as much effort to verify the submissions made by the American
industry demanding relief as is now devoted by the Commerce De-
partment to the verification of the materials that the foreign export-
ers submit when they are subjected to these kinds of proceedings. If
we really believe in fairness and due process, that is a minimal
reform.
I have provided you with a fairly long laundry list of ideas. I hope
that it at least provides our following panelists many targets at which
to shoot.
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Panel I: Respondents
PROFESSOR KOH: Our next speaker is the Honorable Thomas J.
Aquilino of the U.S. Court of International Trade. Judge Aquilino was for-
merly Vice President of three transportation companies. He graduated from
Rutgers Law School then clerked at the Southern District of New York. He
then went on to the firm of Davis, Polk & Wardwell and subsequently has
joined the Court of International Trade. Judge Aquilino, Mr. Ehrenhaft has
just suggested that you should be out of a job. I am curious as to your reaction.
JUDGE AQUILINO: Mr. Ehrenhaft may be right. As we know,
the role of the courts in this country is essentially passive and, there-
fore, silence away from the courthouse is advisable, if not a neces-
sity. Nevertheless, in view of Peter Ehrenhaft's challenging remarks,
I want to make several observations.
First and foremost, this country has been committed since its ear-
liest days to the resolution of problems through the use of lawyers
and judicial review. That a traditional legal approach has been de-
veloped to address present problems of international trade was thus
certainly predictable. The antidumping and countervailing duty law
that has developed, though complex, is narrow in its application.
This law, Mr.Ehrenhaft, is hardly draconian, which may well be the
reason why it does not dispose of all the trade problems that ail us.
It is not my perception that Executive discretion has diminished as a
result of this law, nor is it my perception that proceedings within the
Department of Commerce and the International Trade Commission
are conscious preliminaries to court resolutions, as claimed in one
of Mr.Ehrenhaft's very thoughtful and challenging articles. 6 On the
contrary, administrative discretion is broad; while judicial discretion
is essentially nonexistent.
Mr. Ehrenhaft, in past presentations, has suggested dealing with
some cases, which he would characterize as "small," in court, while
leaving so-called "big" cases to political or economic resolution.
However, unlike Mr. Ehrenhaft and Mr. Justice Scalia, and perhaps
others, I am not able to distinguish between big and small cases in
advance of their presentment and resolution, which, as I understand
the thesis, would be the point at which a small case would go to
immediate court resolution, with the big cases going to a "different
kind of international consultative regime." Query: Was it clear in
6. Ehrenhaft, The "Judicialization" of Trade Law, reprinted in The United States,
Transnational Business, and the Law 65 (B. Allen & C. Ward ed. 1985).
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1954 that Brown v. Board of Education7 would affect more than local
school districts in the four states before the Supreme Court? Pick-
ing up on something Professor Koh said at the outset, query: Have
international regimes in place in the aftermath of World War II ac-
tually ameliorated the international trade problems we now face?
The courts, and here I am talking specifically about the Court of
International Trade, the federal circuit, and even the Supreme
Court, clearly are not responsible for what has been characterized as
the "judicialization" of international trade law. The courts, just as
clearly, are not in any real position to measure the overall effects of
their rulings in this area. Finally, the last comment that I would
make from the court's limited vantage point is that though the an-
tidumping and countervailing duty law does provide a framework to
assess specific reasons for trade imbalances, the law has not trans-
ferred the process of policymaking out of the hands of the Congress
and the Executive, wherein it must, and still does, rest.
PROFESSOR KOH: Our next speaker is Mr. Michael Stein. He is a
graduate of Swarthmore and Columbia University, a former lecturer in law in
South Africa, trial attorney at the Civil Division of the Justice Department,
and Deputy General Counsel and then General Counsel of the International
Trade Commission. He is now a partner at Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer
& Wood in Washington and I am curious as to what his views from both sides
of the coin are about an aggressive ITC.
MR. MICHAEL H. STEIN: I will answer that question first. The
notion of an aggressive ITC is an oxymoron. It is just inconceiv-
able. Placing trade policy in an agency that was created precisely to
take it out of politics is just crazy. The fact is that in Washington,
short-term planning is the next session of Congress and long-term
planning is the next election. You are not going to have a system for
making trade policy that is independent of the political process. To
the contrary, the reason we have the sort of trade policy apparatus
we do is because of the fact that government is a creature of politics.
It is impossible in our government to establish an agency with credi-
bility sufficient to override political considerations. Why don't we
have an industrial policy? If we were able to pick winners and losers
among emerging industries, we would find that the winners were
always in the districts of whichever senator or congressman con-
trolled the relevant appropriations committee. The result of these
sorts of pressures is the trade policy we have today, which is not
nearly as irrational as has been made out by the first two speakers.
7. 349 U.s. 294 (1954).
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You have to recognize what the goal of trade policy is. If you
believe that world prosperity is enhanced by open markets and mini-
mum government intervention, then the purpose of trade policy
should be to deflect the political pressures that arise from industries
that find themselves disadvantaged by this sort of open world com-
petition. Our trade policy has been established precisely to create
the illusion of relief for these industries. Its purpose is to set up a
system that is so complex and so intricate that, on their way to relief,
these industries don't quite understand what went wrong. By the
time they get through the system, get what is supposed to be relief,
and find out that it doesn't work, they are simply too exhausted to
go back and begin again. I would argue that the system works pretty
well.
As Peter Ehrenhaft mentioned, there are a number of run-of-the-
mill trade disputes, handled generally as dumping or countervailing
duty cases, brought by industries where the result will not have a
macro effect on prosperity in the United States or the world at large.
Sometimes if the case is small enough it can be handled through the
escape clause, Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974.8 This statute
provides that if the International Trade Commission decides that
rising imports are seriously injuring a domestic industry, it can rec-
ommend tariffs or quotas to the President, who then decides on
whether to implement them in light of the national economic
interest.
In terms of helping a domestic industry cope with competition,
Section 201 makes no sense. It does not deal with any of the things
you would want to consider, such as the likelihood that relief will
help restore competitiveness. But, if the industry is small enough
and is in a state that doesn't have much else going for it, a domestic
industry can sometimes get relief. The clothespin industry had 200
employees, but the two Senators from Maine staked their political
careers on getting that industry relief. It got relief. The cedar
shakes and shingles industry that was mentioned earlier was the
same sort of thing. It is a very small industry from states in the Far
West. The industry got relief, essentially for two reasons. One, it
did not affect the overall economy, so it was politically acceptable.
Two, the lumber industry as a whole was complaining about Cana-
dian subsidies, and the Administration wanted to send a message.
8. Pub. L. No. 93-618, Title II, 88 Stat. 1978, 2011-2014 (1975) (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
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Many trade decisions can be explained by such political
externalities.
The system works reasonably well for small industries. For large
industries, the formal legal processes do not work well at all. How-
ever, I think that private parties and the government really are start-
ing to do a little better now. I will take as my text two cases-
automobiles and semiconductors-in which the contrast between
the two was really important. In each there were trade disputes that
our government had to deal with, and ones I think illustrate the play
between the judicial and the political branches.
In the automobile case, for years American automobile companies
produced a product whose main purpose was defining the social sta-
tus of the people who bought it. It incidentally got you from one
place to the other. The Japanese came up with the revolutionary
notion of having a product whose major purpose was getting you
from one place to another efficiently and cheaply. People then de-
cided that it wasn't really that important to have their social status
defined; they would rather spend less to get from one place to an-
other. As a result, the American automobile companies faced a seri-
ous problem. Chrysler Corporation was bankrupt for all intents and
purposes. Ford Motor Company was losing money in amounts that
were unacceptable, and had the problem gone on I think that Ford
would have produced its automobiles in Europe and exported them
to the United States. (General Motors is so large it probably could
have survived.) Nevertheless, it would have been unthinkable for the
nation's major consumer-durable product, accounting for between
one out of five or one out of seven jobs in the country, depending
on how you count, to be produced in major part in another country.
It was not possible politically to allow free trade to operate. Some
government policy had to be formulated.
The trade laws told the automobile companies, "Go to the ITC,
show you are seriously injured, show imports are the cause, and
then the President will do something about it." But the ITC said, in
effect, "Sorry, you forgot to say 'Simon says.' " The Commission
decided that because there was a recession in progress, the reces-
sion was more important than imports. It was a fundamentally mis-
taken decision. Nonetheless, that was the decision of the
judicialized administrative agency. The result was that the President
had almost no options. The major remaining option was legislation,
and rather than that the United States Trade Representative
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(USTR)9 went to Japan and said, "I'm not negotiating with you, you
understand that, because I have no authority to negotiate. And in
fact the Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust Division told me
that he would bring action against me if I did negotiate with you
because I would be conspiring in restraint of trade. However, I do
want to forecast that Congress will pass and the President will sign a
law establishing quotas unless you voluntarily restrain exports."
And the Japanese did. There was no thought to an overall strategy
for the industry, and the result was that necessary action was taken
in a way that was substantially less beneficial to the United States
and more beneficial to our major trading partner than it had to be.
In the semiconductor case, the industry was a victim of foreign
industrial targeting. It was faced with a closed market in Japan,
while being forced to compete with dumped imports in its home
market. It therefore found it difficult to obtain the cash flow needed
to remain competitive in this research-intensive industry, where
R&D expenditures can be as much as 20% of sales, and where the
product may change completely every three years.
Through what I think was a much more sophisticated use by pri-
vate parties of the trade laws, sufficient pressure was put on the Ad-
ministration to force it to think about what made sense for the
future of this industry. The Administration devised and imple-
mented a coordinated strategy to come to agreements with our ma-
jor trading partners that would prevent the dumping of the
overcapacity that was in the industry, and that would open markets.
The solution may actually turn out to be beneficial for the world
trading system as a whole. And the interesting thing about it was
that there were people in the government who were looking at the
question of what makes sense in terms of the United States for trade
policy, not simply looking at the requirements of the trade relief
statutes to see how little action they could get away with. This is
new and, I think, really one of the first hopeful signs that I have seen
in my 10 years in this field.
PROFESSOR KOH: Our fourth and final panelist is Mr. Harvey Apple-
baum, from the Washington law firm of Covington & Burling. He is a gradu-
ate of Yale College and Harvard Law School. (I guess he will tell us in a
moment where his true loyalties lie.) He was an editor of the Harvard Law
Review and a Sheldon Traveling Fellow. Since 1963 he has been at Coving-
ton & Burling, where his specialties have been international trade and anti-
trust. He is former Chairman of the Antitrust Section of the American Bar
9. See Glossary at 130.
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Association. He has lectured at the University of Virginia and at Georgetown
Law School. Finally, he is on the Board of Governors of the Association of
Yale Alumni, which means that he is responsible for much of the well-being of
this University.
MR. HARVEY M. APPLEBAUM: There are several reasons why
it is a special pleasure for me to be on this program. The first is that
the Moderator, Harold Koh, was formerly at Covington & Burling.
Second, as Professor Koh mentioned, while I am a Yale College
graduate, and a member of the Board of Governors of the Associa-
tion of Yale Alumni, this is my first opportunity to participate in a
Yale Law School function. My only previous connection with Yale
Law School is that Dean Calabresi taught me freshman economics in
1955. Finally and most intimidatingly, to my knowledge this is the
first time my daughter Julie, who is a senior at Yale and is in the
audience, has ever heard me speak publicly, as distinguished from in
the household.
I have been practicing trade law for 25 years and indeed began
practicing when it was not as fashionable and popular as it is now.
There are two perspectives that should be disclosed as background
to my comments. First, I represent both foreign and domestic in-
dustries in trade law cases and, indeed, it is becoming increasingly
difficult to tell the difference between the two. And second, as you
know, I practice both antitrust and international trade. When one
talks about judicialization and legalism you can contrast the two at
many stages. My own view is that trade law cases have become
judicialized and legalistic in spades.
Trade law cases are extraordinarily complex and involve extraor-
dinarily detailed and burdensome procedures both before the Com-
merce Department, the International Trade Commission, and the
courts. One can spend great time on the intricacies of what is the
cost of production of a product in Canada or Japan, or what is an
"upstream subsidy" in a particular country. These cases represent
intense litigation on two fronts. The parties are back and forth be-
tween the Department of Commerce and the ITC in antidumping
and countervailing duty cases. To my knowledge, there is no other
federal body of laws where there are simultaneously two separate
federal agencies "adjudicating." In addition, they may be in court at
the same time that they are involved in an administrative review of
an antidumping or countervailing duty order.
There are also extraordinarily unrealistic time limits. These strict
time limits simply do not permit reasoned analysis, either as to
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whether there are sales at less than fair value or subsidies, or
whether there has been injury. This is not the fault of the adminis-
tering agencies; it is what Congress has provided. Every time Con-
gress touches the trade laws it tries to make them faster and more
expeditious. The notion is that when a United States industry has
trade difficulty, it somehow should obtain fast relief. The ITC must
analyze the cause of injury, for example, with respect to the U.S.
semiconductor industry, the U.S. softwood lumber industry, the
U.S. steel industry, or the U.S. automobile industry within a matter
of months, usually with a one-day hearing. This can be contrasted
with similar issues in an antitrust case tried over many weeks or
months by an administrative law judge at the Federal Trade Com-
mission or by a federal district court judge with no time limits.
There is no parallel between the speed with which trade law cases
have to be decided and what is done in other areas of law such as
antitrust. I agree with Judge Aquilino that it is typical and common
for the United States to address issues through the law and the
courts, but it is not typical to do it in this fashion with the extraordi-
nary time pressures and complexities that are involved.
One of the effects of this situation is that the major cases are set-
tled with intervention by the Executive Branch. Mike Stein de-
scribed the settlement that occurred as a result of an ITC decision
not to find injury in the Section 201 automobile case. The pressure
of major trade cases has led to government-to-government settle-
ments with respect to carbon and specialty steel; some 20 countries
entered into voluntary restraint arrangements in return for the with-
drawal of antidumping and countervailing duty cases. In the last
year, the U.S. has concluded two major agreements, one on soft-
wood lumber from Canada, which was the aftermath of a counter-
vailing duty case, and more recently the semiconductor agreement.
From the perspective of competition policy or perhaps the Anti-
trust Division or the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), these agree-
ments are international cartels, endorsed by the United States
Government. I am not criticizing them for that reason, but that is,
in effect, what they represent. Former Assistant Attorney General
William Baxter, who shaped the Reagan Administration's approach
to the antitrust laws, said that he found the trade laws to be totally
unacceptable and anticompetitive, but they were here to stay, there
was little he could do about them and, therefore, the Department of
Justice would generally have to ignore them. It is interesting that
the near breakdown of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement ne-
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gotiations concerned the antidumping and countervailing duty laws
(i.e., Canada's desire to eliminate its exposure to these laws and the
United States' concern about Canadian subsidies).
I doubt that a private damage remedy, as Peter Ehrenhaft sug-
gests, would resolve the problem. Such a remedy might make the
cases more realistic and meaningful if they were under normal time-
tables. However, discovery against foreign governments in subsi-
dies cases or even discovery against foreign companies could be
problematic. While private companies submit antidumping ques-
tionnaire responses, many of our trading allies have long resisted
discovery in private antitrust cases.
Overall, we have a very expensive and complex trade law system,
and I agree with Mike Stein that it rarely provides meaningful relief.
This is perhaps one meaning of Harold Koh's reference to illusion
versus reality. While I don't agree that the system is intended to
frustrate, the system often does frustrate. U.S. industries prosecute
their cases at great expense. The foreign companies usually also
expend enormous amounts of resources and money. The result
often has very little effect on the marketplace. Many domestic in-
dustries are disappointed after trade cases, whether they win or lose.
In my experience, it is either disappointed or losing domestic indus-
tries that go to Congress and say, "It wasn't us, it wasn't our case.
You have to change the law." And the law is changed periodically;
the Congress is about to change it now. Congress tries its best each
time to make it easier, if not automatic, for domestic industries to
win trade law cases. I suppose providing relief is the role of the law,
of the agencies and of the courts, but Congress always fails. The
agencies and the courts can always find reasons why a particular do-
mestic industry has not satisfied the statutory criteria, however easy
or flexible they are supposed to be.
That is the process. I do not believe that the trade laws are the
answer, but I am not sure that I have an answer. Unless one is con-
cerned about the competition policy aspect (i.e., the competitive
condition of the industry), and Congress does not seem to be, it
seems that the major cases must be settled by government-to-gov-
ernment negotiations. I tend to agree with Mike Stein that for the
smaller cases, the cases themselves are an outlet, if not a scapegoat.
This is not a very sensible way to develop trade policy, but it does
seem to be well established that it is the U.S. way. At least for the
Washington trade bar it provides a very interesting and stimulating
practice.
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Panel I: Questions & Answers
PROFESSOR KOH: We have about 20 to 25 minutes for ques-
tions. I would just like to exercise my prerogative by asking one
question to all the panelists. We have used the terms "judicializa-
tion" and "legalization" interchangeably, but if I understand Peter
Ehrenhaft's point correctly problem is not judicial resolution of
some of these disputes but the problem is legalization, namely the
statutory detail which is involved. I am wondering if the various
panelists will address whether they view both judicialization and le-
galization as a problem, or whether they think that they are different
from one another.
MR. STEIN: We might as well say the weather is a problem. This
is 20th century America. And the way you decide disputes involving
the government is to establish fairly rigorous rules, some form of
due process, and let people go at it.
Trade regulation has been brought kicking and screaming into
the 20th century. I don't think there is very much you can do about
it. Ten years ago, without all these rules, the system was perceived
by domestic industries not to work because they didn't think they
were getting an honest count from the agencies. I think Harvey Ap-
plebaum is exactly correct: Congress' trade policy has been to grant
as little relief as grudgingly as humanly possible because of our
commitment to free trade and, I think, our commitment to competi-
tion policy. The purpose of the trade laws is to provide an outlet for
domestic industries that are injured. When the agencies find ways
to deny relief, Congress tries to fix it. I don't think you can avoid
this judicialization except in the large cases, where there is some-
thing called the "rule of a billion." If there is more than a billion
dollars worth of trade, you cannot leave results to the vicissitudes of
litigation, and you wind up with government-to-government negoti-
ation. I guess that is not terribly surprising. I think there is really
no point in railing against the inevitable demand for and linkage of
judicialization and legalization.
MR. EHRENHAFT: I think Professor Koh has made an impor-
tant distinction between judicialization and legalization. I have sug-
gested the judicial relief aspect for dumping cases, and not for
countervailing duty cases, because I believe that private parties that
are injured by what we can reasonably regard as a business tort-
whether the source of that problem is domestic or foreign-ought
to be able to recover in the normal procedures of a court. I think
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that would enable the injured party to recover damages for itself,
rather than to obtain customs duties that are put into the Treasury if
it wins, and it would enable the normal timetables of judicial cases
to be applied to those particular cases. In addition, I don't find the
problem of foreign discovery a very serious one. I think that our
experience with Section 33710 cases indicates that foreign parties
faced with a best-evidence rule and with the possibility that their
goods will be excluded if they fail to cooperate with a judicial pro-
ceeding would have adequate incentive to continue.
PROFESSOR KOH: Does everybody know what Section 337
cases are?
MR. EHRENHAFT: Section 337 cases are cases brought under
Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, enabling the ITC to exclude
goods, including those that have infringed a U.S. patent or trade-
mark, which are imported through certain unfair trade practices
from entering the country. Section 337 does not apply, however, to
antidumping and countervailing duty unfair trade cases, but there is
no reason why that couldn't be changed.
I think that a judicial model, perhaps in the ITC, along the lines of
a Section 337 action, if damages were recoverable, would satisfy our
normal longings for due process. What I object to is the legaliza-
tion of the rules, such as those requiring adjustments, that go into
exact detail without adequate intellectual or policy orientation to
make them sensible.
So I think there is a distinction, as Professor Koh points out, one
that would particularly make sense for the small cases. Although, as
Judge Aquilino has noted, we can't distinguish between large and
small cases, I think that we all can apply a "rule of a billion" or
something similar. If overall levels of trade are significantly af-
fected, we must look for some out-of-court way to deal with the
problem, because it's larger than two industries objecting or fight-
ing with each other. If we have a small dispute between two compa-
nies, the judicial mold is probably adequate.
JUDGE AQUILINO: So long as trade disputes are legalized with
rules, the system is going to beget the kind ofjudicialization that we
have. It's almost impossible to legalize a matter of international
trade which has such great importance and simultaneously to avoid
the kind of lawyers' process which we have.
10. Trade Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, § 337, 46 Stat. 590, 703-704 (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
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MR. APPLEBAUM: One comment ought to be made about
judicialization. The Trade Agreements Act of 1979,"1 which be-
came effective on January 1, 1980, marked the first time that access
to the courts in antidumping and countervailing duty law cases be-
came available. One result has been that in virtually every case-big
or small-it is almost automatic that either the Commerce Depart-
ment or ITC injury determinations or both go into Judge Aquilino's
Court of International Trade and often thereafter to the Court of
Appeals of the federal circuit.
My own view is that if we have to have a legalized system for trade
disputes, it is not only from the United States' perspective, but also
from the foreign perspective. While I have said these cases are ex-
tremely complex, time unrealistic, etc., I think by and large most
foreign participants in these cases come away with the feeling, using
Michael Stein's terms, that they had a day in court. We have highly
visible administrative procedures with full hearings, with confiden-
tial data given to lawyers under protective order, and with the right
to challenge in court. When I said most cases go to court, that
means on behalf of both sides. There are as many Japanese, Euro-
pean, Canadian, and Brazilian companies in court as United States
industries. (I can remember only 20 or 25 years ago suggesting to a
Japanese company that they bring a lawsuit in the United States, and
at that time they thought it absurd to consider challenging the
United States Government in its own courts.) In sum,judicialization
provides the Department of Commerce and the International Trade
Commission with a discipline, an overseer, and a guidance that they
didn't have before, which will hopefully make them more attentive
to and concerned about the justification and reasonable basis for
their decisions.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I have a comment and a question. I
don't know if I disagree with Harvey Applebaum or not, but based
upon my experience as a trade litigator, I would not call the ITC
process judicial. There is little consideration, if any, given to the
rules of evidence, and there is no effective cross-examination. The
hearings consist primarily of people standing up and giving0what in
court would be at best a closing argument. The parties litigating, if
you want to call it litigating, proceed before the ITC without access
to much-if not most-of the evidence that the commissioners look
at when they decide their cases. I think that, with respect to the
!1. Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2501 et seq. (1982)).
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ITC, one must keep in mind that while there is a formal process it is
not very court-like, if that is what is meant by "judicial."
MR. APPLEBAUM: By judicialization, I was referring to increas-
ing access to the courts and the courts' overviewing or overseeing of
the ITC and the Commerce Department. I don't disagree with your
description of what happens at the ITC; it is a quasi-adjudicative
proceeding at best, and the hearings are more like a legislative hear-
ing than judicial proceeding. What I did mean to say, though, is
that if you contrast U.S. trade law proceedings with those that exist
in some other countries, the U.S. procedure is far more transparent.
I would certainly agree with you, though, that you cannot compare
an ITC, or for that matter, a Commerce Department proceeding,
with a true Administrative Procedure Act (APA) due process pro-
ceeding' 2 or a federal district court proceeding, where you have full
rights of cross-examination and full rights to access to everything in
the record.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I am not sure that I agree, at least with
respect to, for example, the Canadian procedure. As I've observed
it, it is even more judicial. They have hearings with real evidence,
real cross-examination, and real witnesses. The hearings last for
days rather than one day.
MR. APPLEBAUM: The Canadians purport to, of course, pat-
tern their proceedings and substantive standards after the U.S. laws.
When it had less of a caseload, the International Trade Commission,
then called the U.S. Tariff Commission, used to spend six, seven, or
eight days on a hearing. The 1968 Canadian Potash hearing went
on for eight days. But the Commission can't do that any longer,
given time limits and its very heavy docket. Let me ask you given
the time limits that the Congress has imposed, if you see any way in
which the ITC could allow for the kind of process in the Administra-
tive Procedure Act with cross-examination, access to records and
the like. Keep in mind that there are no time limits for proceedings
at the Federal Trade Commission in antitrust cases or any proceed-
ings in the federal district courts. You can take six, eight, twelve
months or more for discovery alone.
MR. EHRENHAFIr: Could Ijust suggest that we do have a model
in the Section 337 situation, one that really ought to be applied by
the Commission? The ITC ought to have hearings judges to hear
these re-determinations with opportunities for the Commission to
12. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 551 et
seq. (1982)).
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review as they do in Section 337 cases, which also operate under
fairly tight timetables. That would be a much more sensible alloca-
tion of resources and a more judicial-type atmosphere for con-
ducting those kind of hearings.
PROFESSOR ANDREAS LOWENFELD:13 Before everybody
gets so fascinated with the judicial and legal models, remember what
a company facing import trouble does. It has a series of options.
You have on the one hand the so-called unfair trade action (the
tilted playing field) where you start with the Commerce Department,
then go to the International Trade Commission, and then one or
the other side goes to court. Or you go with an escape clause case,
where you don't get the administrative agencies first or the courts at
the end.
What's the difference? Take the unemployed auto worker in De-
troit and his brother-in-law who works in Gary, Indiana for a steel
company. They both get laid off. These cases were roughly con-
temporaneous. The steel industry talked about dumping and subsi-
dies ad infinitum, and still does, while the auto companies simply
invoked the escape clause. Why are these routes so different?
Neither one of them really addresses the problem. It's interesting
that Mr. Stein says that the ITC decided the auto case wrong. I sub-
mit it doesn't make any difference. If the ITC had decided the auto-
mobile escape clause case in the fall of 1980 in favor of the industry,
what would have happened? There would have been a recommenda-
tion to the President which probably would have gone over to the
new term, and there would have been a negotiation of very much
the same thing as what finally happened. So let's not let the delu-
sion of either legal rules or the role of the courts overtake where we
started: namely, control by the political branches. Basically, Peter
Ehrenhaft got it about right.
MR. STEIN: I think there really would have been a difference had
the ITC decided the auto case affirmatively. If you had a govern-
ment that cared about overall industrial strategy, it could have fash-
ioned relief that would have been substantially better for the world
trading system than what ended up to be the case with the voluntary
restraint "non-agreement agreement." You could have, for exam-
ple, gone to a tariff rather than de facto quota, which would have at
least kept the economic rents in the United States instead of Japan.
You could have put some sort of performance requirements on the
domestic industry. Finally, you would not have had what I thought
13. See Participants' Biographies at xi.
Yale Law & Policy Review
was a humiliating extra-legal non-negotiation. All this could have
been done in accordance with international rules, so I think it would
have been useful.
The steel industry's problems and the automobile industry's
problems, I think, were substantially different. Overcapacity and
government subsidization is a tremendous problem in world steel
trade because investments in steel plants throughout the world are
not based on market considerations, but on considerations of indus-
trial economic policies, or perceptions of economic prestige. The
result is a serious problem of dumping. If I ran a steel company and
I were thinking about modernization, and I looked around the world
and realized that into the indefinite future I would be faced with
competitors who were prepared to sell in my market at marginal
cost, I think I'd put my money into an oil company instead. (To
show how smart the steel industry is, USX did buy an oil company,
but at the top of the market.)
To continually criticize an industry for failing to invest and mod-
ernize, when such investments are plainly uneconomical, seems to
me to be at least to some degree unfair. There is a public policy
justification for a steel program. The industry uses the trade laws
essentially the way you use the two-by-four on the mule: to get the
government's attention. And having gotten the government's atten-
tion, the industry and government ought to try to work out some
sort of strategy that makes sense. I don't think that in the handling
of the automobile and steel cases there was a lot of thought within
the government about how to tailor relief to come up with some-
thing sensible. I think the thought in the government was how to
get these guys off our back.
MR. APPLEBAUM: I agree with Mike Stein that there is a vast
difference between presidential relief under trade laws, such as Sec-
tion 201, which incidentally is the safeguard provision of the GATT,
and what we get out of voluntary restraint arrangements. However,
unlike Mike, I think the ITC decided the auto case correctly. The
perspective of our foreign allies was that even when the domestic
industry brings a case and loses under what we're calling quasi-judi-
cial or adjudicative procedures, then all it has to do is go to Con-
gress and say, "We lost but the law is bad, give us relief." But Mike
Stein's point is very important: Under Section 201, we would have
controlled the relief, including the procedures and the time frame.
As it turned out, it was left to the Japanese government both to im-
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pose and to administer the relief, and of course, every year we have
had to have this non-negotiation that Mike's been talking about.
PROFESSOR KOH: Let me just point out that the term Section
201 refers to the President's escape clause authority, the discretion-
ary form of import relief as opposed to the non-discretionary form
in a Section 301 unfair trade practice case.
PROFESSOR LOWENFELD: I just want to respond for a mo-
ment to the notion that, if the escape clause action in automobiles
had gone the other way, the U.S. government would have been in
charge and they probably would have put on a tariff. If so, then
what? We would have had higher prices and the American automo-
bile companies still would not have shaped up. Following the
course we chose, looking at Ford 10 years later, it's a success story.
It's a success story partly because the American auto companies re-
alized that they couldn't press their own government and that they
could not count on the Japanese forever, and so they shaped up.
MR. STEIN: I think they would have shaped up anyway. What
they needed was time, and they got that time. I think, however, they
courd have gotten the time more efficiently.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I find something kind of unreal about
the economics behind these dumping decisions. Peter Ehrenhaft in-
dicated that he thought the U.S. Swiss cheese group should have
gotten relief because it was a lot more expensive to make Swiss
cheese in Switzerland than the price at which it could be sold here.
The story told, however, seemed to imply that in fact the Swiss were
internalizing in their price the benefits to the tourist trade and the
benefits of stopping people from moving from the countryside to
the cities. That seems to me to make sense. How, administratively,
does a court take into account the internalization of those kinds of
costs in making a decision about their value?
MR. EHRENHAFT: That's a very good question, and you've put
your finger on a couple of very important points. If we are con-
cerned about consumer welfare, then obviously we should welcome
dumped and subsidized goods. We should want to have foreign
companies dump their goods here, and we should welcome the
transfer of resources from the Swiss to us when they sell $4.00
cheese for $1.00 in this country. Why do we not want cheap goods?
The principal reason is the one that I have mentioned, our concern
about employment. We are more concerned about maintaining em-
ployment of our workers than we are about getting cheap merchan-
dise for them. And we are concerned that, if foreign companies can
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dump their merchandise in this country willy-nilly, they are going to
capture the market permanently after our workers are laid off and
our investors have pulled out. It's a transfer of the unemployment
and adjustment problem from their country to ours. We think it's
unfair for them, if they have employment problems, to keep the sta-
tus quo of those people making cheese and make our workers look
for new jobs in semiconductors. That's the philosophical, and prob-
ably the only correct, basis upon which we can justify dumping and
countervailing duty laws: Namely, that we should prevent the shift
of the burden of adjustment from abroad to here. That is the only
basis that I believe really makes sense.
PROFESSOR GARY HUFBAUER:' 4 I wanted to ask about Peter
Ehrenhaft's two main themes. Question one: If you get the govern-
ment out of the small cases and turn them over to private litigators
in the court system, do you think the private court system will be
open with the underlying allegations of improper, unfair govern-
ment intervention, toleration of cartels, toleration of restrictive
practices against unions, etc., or do you think instead that in the
small cases we won't need to have the courts involved because those
issues will be taken up by the U.S. government in the large cases?
Question two has to do with another theme you raised: simplifica-
tion. If I understand simplification, it means getting rid of-or sub-
stantially narrowing-the powers of the Department of Commerce,
the ITC and possibly the USTR. In any event, it means substantially
reducing the government bureaucracy and probably getting rid of
pages of administrative regulations, the Federal Register, and legisla-
tion that has built up over the years. As you well know, Peter, better
than anyone else, the current omnibus act is going in exactly the
wrong direction. Maybe you think the revolution in terms of simpli-
fication is going to be coming much sooner if things are getting so
bad that the breakdown is imminent. So, I'd like a forecast on the
proximity of simplification.
MR. EHRENHAFI': I guess one of the greatest insights one gains
from having been in the government, as you know, is how helpless
you are. As a government official, there is a tide of events in time
that moves on regardless of who is in power, and I think that has
been true in our trade law. There hasn't been a significant differ-
ence whether Republicans or Democrats nominated the incumbents,
at least in this particular field.
14. See Participants' Biographies at x.
Special Issue 1: 14, 1988
Private Remedies
Your first question was: How are the courts going to deal with
issues such as restrictive union practices, environmental rules, and
other kinds of aspects that can influence prices? I don't think that
those kinds of considerations play a role today in dumping cases.
I'm talking about making a private damage action available for a
price discrimination tort that would be identical whether the dis-
criminator was domestic or foreign, and I don't know that union
rules, environmental rules, or any of those things have any role to
play in it. I don't think that they do in our administrative dumping
cases and I don't think that they would in the judicial model that I
have proposed.
PROFESSOR LOWENFELD: Treble damages?
MR. EHRENHAFr: I wouldn't necessarily have treble damages,
no. I would have simple damages as an adequate compensation.
PROFESSOR LOWENFELD: Would you have to show injury?
MR. EHRENHAFr: Yes, the way that you would in an ordinary
antitrust case.
PROFESSOR LOWENFELD: That would mean changing the
dumping laws.
MR. EHRENHAFr: Yes, absolutely. You'd have to accept that
the purpose in the dumping law is to address injury from dumping
as opposed to dumped imports.
I think that the ITC is woefully mistaken in its approach on that. I
think that the problems you are talking about, such issues as the
environmental laws, the labor rules, and so on, are very serious
problems but not ones that can appropriately be addressed, or
should be addressed, within the confines of a particular case. I re-
member the environmental issue was raised by the Indonesians
when we told them that it was unfair that they had no scrubbers on
their steel mills and that this enabled them to ship their steel at
much lower cost to the United States than that of our producers
because of their investments in environmental controls. They said
that the United States had polluted the world in the 1890s, and now
it was their turn. In addition, they responded that it was appropriate
for an underdeveloped country to put its priorities where it had to
with its limited resources, and the first priority was to make the steel
and to worry about the air later. These are not questions that can be
answered glibly or quickly, especially within the very short time lim-
its of dumping and subsidy cases, and I don't think they should be.
As for your second question, as to whether we're going to see a
simplification revolution in our lifetimes, I think there is only faint
Yale Law & Policy Review
hope that we will, if indeed we can galvanize this audience and
others to see the appropriate light and the wisdom of our views.
Perhaps the students present today will remedy the procedure when
they become practitioners. One problem is that too many lawyers,
as we presently turn them out of most law schools, profit too much
from the present system as it is. Therefore, we are unlikely to see
much pressure for reform from within the trade bar. As far as in-
dustry, and even more so the Congress, is concerned, these issues
are greatly complicated and they have been so laden down with slo-
gans that people accept as fact, such as the need to address "unfair
trade practices" by others when we do exactly the same kind of
things and when, in fact, a price discrimination policy is a very sensi-
ble policy that most businessmen adopt for most of their sales. We
have to get rid of all of that baggage, and perhaps only when it col-
lapses of its own weight is there reasonable expectation for change.
A true movement for reform is unlikely.
MR. APPLEBAUM: I think we've seen the revolution, but it's
been in the opposite direction of what you're suggesting. I think
what has happened to the trade laws in the last 20 years has been a
revolution. There has been a vast and dramatic change, but it's
been as you've heard on the panel today, toward more complexity,
more lawyering, more procedures, more judicial intervention. What
I have observed, which doesn't seem to make any difference, is that
increasingly the Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways
and Means Committee staffs and members of Congress recognize
that "tinkering" with the trade laws won't eliminate the deficit. The
General Accounting Office has estimated that if all of the unfair im-
ports were absolutely embargoed, excluded from the country, it
would only affect 5% to 10% of the trade deficit. But knowing that,
even recognizing that trade laws are not the answer, Congress
seems increasingly to want to make them more legalistic, and to
make them more accessible, and to make more domestic industry
victories possible. I don't see that stopping any time soon. In disa-
greement with Peter, I think the trade bar in Washington and else-
where has been one of the more responsible, restraining voices on
what Congress has been doing.
MS. JUDITH BELLO: 15 My question to the panel and to Judge
Aquilino in particular is whether in this increasingly legalized,
judicialized review process, we really need two layers of judicial re-
15. See Participants' Biographies at viii.
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view? Should we retain at first resort the Court of International
Trade, and then resort to the federal circuit?
JUDGE AQUILINO: That is obviously a question for the political
branches in Washington to resolve. I don't think there's an inherent
reason why a two-level review exists.
MR. STEIN: I think there is a reason. I'm not sure it's working
out the way it ought to, but there should be more than one judge to
decide questions of policy, which is why there are three judges on
the circuit courts of appeals. It's just very, very dangerous to have a
single level in the Court of International Trade, because then you
could have a single person who easily could be mistaken, with only
Supreme Court review, making decisions on what the law means. If
you do it the other way around, you have a court of appeals. The
major contribution that the Court of International Trade can make
in the dumping and countervailing area is to "marry in haste and
repent at leisure." There's a tremendous premium on getting deci-
sions fast. They're not always correct. If you have single-judge re-
view in the Court of International Trade, you can actually get into
the record and fix blunders. And I think it is that sort of searching,
factual review that has had some effect at the Commerce Depart-
ment, but so far no effect whatsoever at the ITC. No ITC decision
has been reversed through judicial review so far. If you had review
only in the Court of Appeals, I think what you would get is the
Court of Appeals now and again focusing on some questions of stat-
utory interpretation, but otherwise judicial review would not serve
the function it ordinarily does because it is inconceivable that the
court could get into the detailed examination of the record that is
necessary for judicial review to perform its function. So, I think we
are stuck with two levels of review.
MR. EHRENHAFr: My response would be the opposite. I would
say, abandon all judicial review, or most of it. I think that it has had
an important disciplining attribute because of the point that Mike
makes, that the agencies have to act so quickly, but then everyone
runs into court anyway so that everyone slowly and methodically can
review what has been done. Why not have a more realistic timetable
to begin with and allow a correct procedure that wouldn't necessi-
tate that meticulous, after-the-fact review? I think that the problems
that Congress observed at the time that the Trade Agreements Act
of 1979 was adopted-namely, the failure of the agencies to articu-
late why they were doing things-was something that the Treasury
was beginning to address. I think that the Treasury started publish-
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ing opinions that ran for more than one column in the Federal Regis-
ter, and attempted to lay out the reasons why it decided as it did. If
that had been continued, and if one were to adopt an administrative
law judge type of proceeding, and then had judicial review only of
that through normal APA-type proceedings, I think we would have
an adequate procedure ofjudicialized decisionmaking and the level
of review appropriate and traditional in our entire legal system with-
out this whole panoply of courts. Sorry, Judge Aquilino, I don't
want to unemploy you, but I am not convinced that the Court of
International Trade is a necessary addition to our court system.
MR. APPLEBAUM: I think we ought to rescue Judge Aquilino.
Even if antidumping and countervailing duties were eliminated, the
Court of International Trade has other functions, including the cus-
toms and tariff laws, and others. More broadly, I would like to com-
ment that the issue of whether you have two courts or one, whether
you want, in a sense, a new review of the factual record in detail by
the Court of International Trade, as distinguished from what we
have in normal APA proceedings, like with the Federal Trade Com-
mission, where you have a fully developed record below with full
cross examination, discovery, evidentiary rules, and then you go
straight to the United States Court of Appeals. I find that there are
good arguments on both sides of that question. If you had more
realistic timetables, then it would augur more for the need for only
one reviewing court, but you'd still have the question about the rec-
ord developed below that a court of appeals would normally review.
In the absence of more realistic timetables at the Court of Interna-
tional Trade, you have more access to the administrative record
than you do below. So it seems to me that there are well-drawn
lines of argument, and it may be that it's the procedural time ele-
ment of the statutes, not so much their substantive policy, that
prompts some to believe you need both levels of review.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I'm a trade lawyer with Schnader, Harri-
son in Washington. I hear a strong thread of "inevitability" running
through a lot of the comments here today. The automobile case
probably would have gone very much the same way whatever deci-
sion the ITC came up with. Peter Ehrenhaft felt he had very little
control, even though he was in a very responsible position in the
government. And, I have had this feeling as I have watched the
trade law process in any number of examples. I wonder, first of all,
if people could comment on this in general.
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I'd also like to offer an hypothesis in particular, which is that there
is a "consumer interest," and I don't just mean the usual retail con-
sumer, but particularly the industrial consumer. If, for example, the
price of steel is put up too high to protect. the steel industry, you
may make it impossible for the auto industry to compete. A perfect
example now is with Toshiba. People were ready to tear Toshiba to
shreds, and American industry came rushing in and said, "My God,
don't do that! We need what they have, and they're supplying us."
Thus, you keep finding this tension between industrial consumers
and producers. If the basic premise is correct that an open trading
system is in our national interest, along with everybody else's na-
tional interest, the fact is that there is always some interest hurt any
time we try protectionist devices and judicial and legislative
interventions.
MR. EHRENHAF'r: I think that as a matter of fact those con-
sumer interests are sometimes taken into account, for example, if
you recall the escape clause case on copper. The main reason why
the President decided not to grant relief to the copper industry was
his finding that it would drive up the price of copper to the extent
that the copper users would be substantially injured, and that there
were many more companies in the copper using business than there
were in the copper mining business. The way that the escape clause
under Section 201 is structured allows the President to take such
interests into account in deciding whether or not to grant relief.
I think that one of the problems we have in the countervailing
duty and dumping cases under Section 301 is that these kinds of
discretionary considerations are not allowed to be raised. The only
consideration is the injury to the competing producer. This is ex-
actly why American industries try to push everything into the coun-
tervailing/antidumping model, because it is just in those kinds of
proceedings where those consumer interests are not permitted to be
considered by the Administration.
MR. APPLEBAUM: Let me add that another reason to go the
antidumping/countervailing duty route under Section 301 is that
you don't have any competition policy considerations. The Depart-
ment of Justice earlier, and the Federal Trade Commission more
recently, have tried unsuccessfully from time to time to persuade the
ITC to take into account the effect on the competitive condition of
the industry bringing the case. (I'm not saying this was proper, be-
cause the Congress didn't direct these actors to consider the compe-
tition policy, but that it has been without success.) On the other
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hand, if you have a Section 201 escape clause proceeding, the Presi-
dent can take into account competition concerns as well as con-
sumer concerns.
This platter of options becomes a critical cutting edge for a do-
mestic industry seeking to bring an import relief case. The an-
tidumping and countervailing duty laws, while they are complex and
involve judicial review and the like, contain no element of presiden-
tial discretion or arguably no element of politics except in the very
biggest cases that do get into government-to-government negotia-
tions. If you file a Section 201 case, however, seeking quotas or tar-
iffs such as for the copper, automobiles, and steel cases you've heard
about, even if you win at the ITC, you still suffer the risk, for unre-
lated reasons, that the President might not grant the relief. So,
when you're talking about the consumer interests and, I would add,
competition policy interests, there are very great differences be-
tween these various trade law options.
MR. STEIN: I think the most important change in government
trade policy in the second Reagan Administration is the beginning
of the recognition that the national interest might actually matter.
These notions that whatever the market dictates is what was or-
dained by God to happen, that the high dollar is wonderful because
it shows we're rich, and that it is fine if other governments' indus-
trial or adversarial trading policies permit them to sell massive
amounts of goods to us-while we can't sell anything to them-are
finally beginning to break down.
This panel is entitled, "Administrative Agencies, Private Parties,
and the Courts." I think that our trade policy formulation system is
unusual in that it is driven, not by government's perception of what
is necessary in the national interest, but by private parties' actions in
focusing the government on particular trade disputes. It seems to
me there are now three really major trade disputes that have to be
solved: semiconductors, supercomputers, and large transport air-
craft. I think that the United States government is finally starting to
focus on the question of what policies make sense, not only for the
producing industries, but for the consuming interest, and for the
world trading system as a whole. It may be, however, that the only
way that you can create a sensible trading system is to deny access to
our market now and again as a tool for getting other governments to
recognize that certain policies of theirs may not be in the overall
world economic interest.
Special Issue 1: 14, 1988
Private Remedies
An interesting example of this is the lumber agreement with Can-
ada. I think the uniform reaction to this agreement by observers
was: "It's terrible! It establishes a cartel! It raises prices! It's aw-
ful!" The United States lumber industry argued, with ultimate suc-
cess, that Canadian timber cutting policies were fundamentally
irrational, that they were destroying their forests in order to pro-
mote short-term employment in their lumber production industry,
and that the overall result was a substantial misallocation of eco-
nomic resources. A countervailing duty case was brought. But, it
was politically much too sensitive a case to be brought to resolution
in that process. There were government-to-government negotia-
tions, resulting in a 15% export tax by Canada. Basically, the
United States gave up about $500 million a year in trade relief, giv-
ing it to Canada instead as the price for getting this relief. The gov-
ernment of British Columbia two weeks ago decided to raise the
price that it charges for timber, because it turns out that this has not
had the devastating effect on Canada that its industry predicted. In
fact, the Canadian government was providing what amounted to an
unnecessary subsidy to its industry. I think that industry on both
sides of the border will be healthier as a result of this agreement. It
is possible that with respect to semiconductors, if the United States
government ultimately can persuade Japan to act as though it were a
market economy, we will again have a more efficient allocation of
resources in that industry, and the industries in both countries, and
the world trading system as a whole, will benefit.
